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I. INTRODUCTION

Courts stand as the final arbiters of many important and
controversial issues in the United States. While it is the province of
the judicial branch to hear "cases" and "controversies" that impact the
immediate parties to a suit, many modern suits impact unrepresented
parties and thus have policy implications. To describe this
phenomenon, scholars use the terms "private law" and "public law."
As public law gained greater prominence, commentators began
to realize the need to revise the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
facilitate this type of litigation. Historically, unrepresented parties
who were affected by a suit could use the mechanism of intervention
to enter a suit. In 1966, the Federal Rules were modified to allow more
liberal intervention than ever before. Many courts cautioned that the
expansion of intervention could create complexity and inefficiency in
litigation. Although the intervention mechanism is integral to the
modern judicial plan for protecting unrepresented parties, over time,
some of the courts of appeals have created restrictive standards that
significantly frustrate intervention.
This Note attempts to offer a solution to balance the competing
interests of representation and efficiency by focusing on the different
needs of intervention in public- versus private-law litigation. In
private-law litigation, intervention is not as necessary since resolution
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of the suit will likely have little impact on third parties. Furthermore,
this is where intervention may create the greatest inefficiency.
However, in public-law litigation, third parties have a far greater
justification for entering the proceedings. After analyzing exactly how
the current circuit split impacts both private- and public-law
litigation, this Note proposes new standards which take into account
the nature of the suit when determining whether to allow
intervention. Therefore, the solution is to use a more relaxed standard
for intervention in public-law suits and to use limited intervention to
allow the public a voice without adding unnecessary complexity in
both types of litigation.
Part II explains the background of both intervention and
public-law litigation. Part III discusses how the standards for
qualifying intervenors may apply differently in public-law litigation
and analyzes two areas of disagreement among the courts of appeals.
Part IV proposes a solution that protects private plaintiffs while
assuring interested parties are able to participate as necessary in
public-law cases.
II. BACKGROUND

This Part provides the necessary background to understand
why public- and private-law suits may merit different standards for
intervention. First, Section A recounts the development of public-law
litigation and explains how these cases differ from private-law cases.
Second, Section B explains the development and purposes of American
intervention practice. Finally, Section C provides a brief overview of
intervention under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
facilitate the more in-depth analysis in Part III.
A. The Development of Public Law
To understand why the existing intervention standards are
insufficient to meet the needs of the U.S. judicial system, one must
first understand the relatively recent development of public-law
litigation. Originally, most civil litigation consisted of a dispute
between two parties, with the court acting as decisionmaker.1 In this
world, the nature of the suit was largely determined by the parties,
especially the plaintiff, and doctrines like the "plaintiff [is] master of

1.

Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,

1282 (1976).
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the suit"2 were common. Most claims were based on common law, as
opposed to statutory causes of action. 3 However, these norms began to
blur beginning in the nineteenth century as a result of two major
changes to the U.S. legal system.
First, legislative expansion brought on by progressivism-a
general political movement focused on using new statutory law to
accomplish social reform-created a host of new laws, some even with
their own private causes of action. These new federal laws greatly
expanded the effective jurisdiction of the federal courts. 4 This
expansion began after the Civil War with the passing of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments;5 it was buoyed
by important decisions and changing ideas of the judicial process
through the New Deal,6 and it was cemented in the American
consciousness by the Civil Rights Acts.7 These new laws all relied
heavily on the judicial system for enforcement of their "social reform"
goals. 8
Second, modifications to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
altered the essential makeup of the civil suit.9 Prior to 1966, courts
had already begun to incorporate new party structures that allowed
for multiple interests; however, the 1966 amendments expanded and
solidified these changes by stating new standards for required joinder
of parties, class actions, and intervention.10 These rules facilitated a
shift away from the traditional single-plaintiff-versus -singledefendant structure by both requiring and liberally allowing other
parties to join the suit."

FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE
2.
626 (5th ed. 2001).
3.
Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284.
4.
See id. at 1288-89 (discussing the expanding role of federal courts).
5.
U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, XIV, XV.
See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (holding that a
6.
Washington state minimum wage statute for women was constitutional).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
7.
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
8.
See William Burnham, Aspirational and Existential Interests of Social Reform
Organizations:A New Role for the Ideological Plaintiff, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 153, 153
(1985) ("[T]he social reform potential of courts has grown significantly through constitutional
changes, passage of legislation facilitating assertion of constitutional rights, and the creation of a
wide variety of statutory rights and remedies.").
See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental
9.
Paradigm,78 WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 215 (2000) ("This growth was due, in no small part, to the 1966
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
10. See infra notes 32-51 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (allowing certain parties to join the suit).
11.
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Together, these two developments created a new type of
litigation, often relating to issues of public importance, termed "public
law" by Professor Abram Chayes. 12 Among these public issues are
topics such as legislative districting, civil rights, and environmental
concerns. 13 However, merely thinking about this litigation as "public"
fails to convey its extensive differences from private litigation. As
Professor Chayes articulated, public law has eight main differences:
(1) The scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped primarily by the
court and parties.
(2) The party structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and amorphous.
(3) The fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive and legislative.
(4) Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form logically derived
from the substantive liability and confined in its impact to the immediate parties;
instead, it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial lines,
often having important consequences for many persons including absentees.
(5) The remedy is not imposed but negotiated.
(6) The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the affair: its administration
requires the continuing participation of the court.
(7) The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and statement of governing
legal rules; he is active, with responsibility not only for credible fact evaluation but for
organizing and shaping the litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome.
individuals about
(8) The subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private
14
private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy.

As Professor Peter Appel has noted, the concept of public law
has evolved since Professor Chayes's original definition. 15 The modern
idea of public-law litigation usually focuses on cases that will have
"important consequences for many persons including absentees,"16
regardless of whether the case contains all of the factors Professor
Chayes identified.17
Public law has continued to mature and is now a significant
force in the modern legal world. Indeed, a large portion of the modern
U.S. legal system now centers around public law.18 This phenomenon

12. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284 (introducing the differences between public law and
traditional adversary litigation).

13.
24(a), 57
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
system).

See Cindy Vreeland, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule
U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 279-80 (1990) (discussing different types of public law litigation).
Chayes, supra note 1, at 1302.
See Appel, supra note 9, at 221 (discussing varying definitions of public law litigation).
Chayes, supranote 1, at 1302.
See Appel, supra note 9, at 221 (discussing modern views of public law).
See id. at 221-22 (discussing the prevalence of public law in the United States judicial
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is demonstrated both in modern public-law cases and in the rise of
public interest groups that focus their efforts on litigation.
First, modern public-law cases such as Brown v. Board of
EducationI9 and Roe v. Wade20 are by far the most popularly
recognized cases in the modern legal system. 2 1 This is unsurprising
since public-law cases implicate public issues that have "high stakes
and widespread impacts." 22 Public-law cases are also the frequent
subject of professional and academic attention. 23 If cases are studied
for their precedential value, it follows that the cases with the most
widespread impact-that is, public-law cases-would receive the most
attention. 24
Second, public law has created a new type of legal actor: the
public interest group. 25 Based on the wide variety of federal causes of
action, these groups-comprised of individuals who seek to advance
certain philosophical or policy objectives-often focus on litigation to
accomplish their goals. 26 The willingness of individuals to invest both
time and capital to form these organizations demonstrates the
importance of public-law litigation.
With this history, public law has become a significant part of
the judicial system. In Part III, Section A, this Note will further
describe why public law merits a different standard'of intervention.
B. The Development of American Intervention Practice
Public law implicates multiple procedural aspects of litigation.
Indeed, as already noted, several changes in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure gave rise to public law in its modern form. 27 One of these is
the concept of intervention. Intervention recognizes that in a common
law system, the adjudication of a dispute between two parties may

19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1304 (noting how public law cases overwhelmingly receive
the most journalistic attention).
22. Vreeland, supra note 13, at 280.
23. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1304 (noting how public law cases overwhelmingly receive
the most professional debate and academic comment).
24. Accord Appel, supra note 9, at 221 (discussing how the wide precedential impacts of
certain cases give them significance).
25. See generally Vreeland, supra note 13, at 280-81 (discussing the growth and
development of public interest groups.
26.

See ROBERT A. BAUM, PUBLIc INTEREST LAW: WHERE LAW MEETS SOCIAL ACTION 44-60

(1987) (detailing litigation efforts of various public interest groups).
27. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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affect absent third parties.28 If the absent parties have a sufficient
interest, then they should be allowed to enter the litigation to
represent their position. 29 This Section recounts the development of
intervention practice in U.S. jurisprudence and discusses the guiding
principles behind the modern mechanism of intervention.
1. The Development of Modern Intervention
The mechanism of intervention originated in Roman law and
involved the practice of allowing a third party to enter litigation in
order to protect its interest.30 Professors James Moore and Edward
Levi's scholarship shows that by the 1930s, the concept of intervention
was already well rooted in American jurisprudence, although its only
statutory basis was the restrictive provisions of Equity Rule 37.31 In
1937, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 replaced Equity Rule 37.32
The Advisory Committee responsible for Rule 24 stated that the rule
"amplifies and restates the present federal practice at law and in
equity."33
Despite neither creating a completely new mechanism nor
completely overruling common law intervention, 34 Rule 24 did make
two notable changes.35 First, the Rule followed Professors Moore and
Levi's suggestion of splitting intervention into two areas: cases
28.

Federal Civil Procedure:PrejudicialEffects of Stare Decisis Can Compel Interventionof

Right Under Rule 24(a), 1967 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1251.

29. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (requiring a sufficient interest for intervention).
30. James WM. Moore & Edward H. Levi, Federal Intervention I. The Right to Intervene
and Reorganization,45 YALE L.J. 565, 568 (1936). More recent scholarship challenges the Roman
origin of this practice. See Appel, supra note 9, at 241 (challenging Moore and Levi's account of
the development of intervention in Roman law).
31. See generally Moore & Levi, supra note 30, at 578 (detailing the history of Equity Rule
37). Equity Rule 37 read in relevant part: "Anyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at
any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in
subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding." 7c CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1903 n.2 (3d ed. 2012).
32. FED. R. CIv. P. 24 advisory committee notes on 1937 adoption. The original Rule 24(a)
read: "Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a
statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof." FED R. CIV. P. 24(a) (1937) (amended in 1966).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee notes on 1937 adoption.
34. True Gun-All Equip. Corp. v. Bishop Int'l Eng'g Co., 26 F.R.D. 150, 151 (E.D. Ky. 1960)
('This rule really introduced no new procedure but merely amplifies and restates the federal
practice, both at law and in equity.").
35. See generally Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141, 153 (S.D. Cal. 1954)
("Mhe incidence of intervention has been enlarged. . . .").
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involving a specific piece of real or personal property and cases where
the applicant had an interest in the litigation. 36 Second, the Rule
notably did not include Equity Rule 37's requirement that
"intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the
propriety of the main proceeding." 37 Thus, Rule 24 expanded the
concept of intervention. 38
Although courts generally recognized that Rule 24 widened
intervention beyond the common law standard, early interpretations
were still quite restrictive. 39 Especially problematic was the Supreme
Court's interpretation in Sam Fox PublishingCo. v. United States that
a party must be "bound by a judgment" (that is, the party must face
res judicata) in order to intervene. 40 In response, the Rule was once
again amended in 1966 to read:
(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene
who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (2) claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that
41
interest.

The amendments made two significant changes to the Rule.
First, it statutorily overruled the Sam Fox res judicata rule by
removing the requirement of being legally bound. 42 In doing so, the
Rule substituted a requirement that an intervenor must have an
"interest" in the litigation. Second, the Rule was amended to remove
the property requirement for intervention4 3 The new Rule entitled
absentees to intervene, regardless of whether physical property was
involved, if they would be "substantially affected in a practical sense
by the determination made in an action." 44

36. See Appel, supra note 9, at 246 ("Moreover, the structure of the rule followed Moore and
Levi's division of intervention into two types.").
37. WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 31, § 1903.
38. Hartley Pen, 16 F.R.D. at 153.
39. See Appel, supra note 9, at 240 (discussing the inflexible interpretations of Rule 24).
40. Sam Fox Publ'g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961); see also Appel, supra
note 9, at 240 (discussing the restrictions Sam Fox placed on intervention).
41. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a).
42. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1903.
43. Id.
44. FED. R. CIv. P. 24 advisory committee notes on 1966 amendment.
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2. Purposes of the Modern Intervention Mechanism
The development of intervention, especially through the 1966
45
amendments, frames the modern purposes of the mechanism.
Specifically, the shift toward the modern, more liberal standard for
intervening reflects three policy concerns: practicality over formalism,
balancing both inside and outside interests, and efficient suit
resolution.
First, the focus on practicality can be seen in the modification
of the "interest" and "property" requirements in the 1966
amendments. By removing the requirement of being legally bound in a
preclusive sense, the current Rule recognizes that an outside interest
may be practically affected so as to warrant intervention even if it is
46
not per se legally bound by the resulting decision. As the Advisory
Committee to the 1966 amendments stated, an absentee should
normally be entitled to intervene if he "would be substantially affected
47
in a practical sense by the determination made in an action."
Furthermore, the lack of a specific definition for what type of
"interest" is required evidences a shift toward a more dynamic,
practical standard compared with the past requirements of a specific
real or personal property interest. 48 Finally, the Rule also notably
leaves the requirement of being "affected" undefined, signaling
additional reliance on practical judgment over formal standards.
Second, the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure evidence
a purpose to balance the interests of both absentees attempting to
intervene and present parties. In contrast, common law intervention
preferenced the original parties. 49 The lack of defined standards in the
modern Rule 24 illustrates an effort to allow courts to balance
competing interests in reaching intervention decisions.5o Furthermore,
Rule 24 is just one part of the larger federal multiparty scheme

45.

See Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and the

Defense of Civil Rights Remedies, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 263, 270 (1999) (discussing how the
changing intervention standards reflect gradual shifts in the purpose for intervention).
46. See id. (arguing that the changes to intervention evidence a shift toward recognizing
the practical consequences of litigation on outsiders).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee notes on 1966 amendment.
48. See id. (discussing the shift to a practical conception).
49. See, e.g., FED. EQUITY R. 37 (1912), reprinted in JAMES HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL
EQUITY RULES 167-68 (1913) (stating that intervening parties should be subordinated to the
main proceeding).
50. See The Litigant and the Absentee in Federal Multiparty Practice, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
531, 532 (1968) ("[A] rigid set of rules will not yield a fair balance in every case . . . .").
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created by Rules 19 (required joinder of parties) and 23 (class action
litigation) to facilitate greater access and protection for absentees.51
The final, and perhaps most significant, purpose of
intervention is to achieve judicial efficiency. 52 Instead of focusing
primarily on the rights or interests of the individual parties, the
purpose of efficiency relates to the "great public interest" of resolving
as "much of the controversy to as many of the parties" as is possible in
one case.53 At times, this public interest may conflict with the private
interests in the suit.5 4 While intervention can achieve efficiency
through judicial economies of scale, it also has the possibility of
creating inefficiency due to overly complex, duplicitous litigation.55
Thus, although never explicitly mentioned in Rule 24, the competing
balance for efficiency can be seen in the timeliness, interest, and
adequacy-of-representation requirements. Put together, these
purposes suggest that the standard for intervention in public-law
cases should focus on practical realities, consider the interests of the
proposed intervenors, and seek to achieve judicial efficiency through
economies of scale without creating unnecessary complexity.
C. Elements of Rule 24(a)(2) Intervention of Right
Rule 24 is divided into two types of intervention.56 The first,
outlined in Rule 24(a)(2), is intervention of right.57 This type of
intervention has the most stringent requirements, but it requires
courts to allow any absentee who meets the requirements to
intervene.58 The second form of intervention is permissive intervention
under Rule 24(b)(2).59 While permissive intervention has a lower
standard for eligibility, it also allows the court discretion on whether
or not to grant intervention.60 The remainder of this Note will focus on
51. See John E. Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 KY. L.J.
329, 374 (1969) (discussing the federal system of multi-party litigation).
52. See Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that a
purpose of intervention is "to foster economy of judicial administration").
53. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 824 (5th Cir. 1967).
54. See id. (discussing the competing private and public interests in intervention).
55. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("The decision whether
intervention of right is warranted thus involves an accommodation between two potentially
conflicting goals: to achieve judicial economies of scale by resolving related issues in a single
lawsuit, and to prevent the single lawsuit from becoming fruitlessly complex or unending.").
56. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1902 (discussing differences between
intervention of right and permissive intervention).
57.
58.

Id.
Id.

59.
60.

Id.
Id.
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the requirements and application of intervention of right, under Rule
24(a)(2). 6 The requirements for intervention of right are: timeliness,
an interest relating to the property or transaction, a practical
impairment of the ability to protect the interest, and a lack of
adequate representation. 62
As a threshold issue, many courts have stated that the Rule 24
elements should be interpreted liberally, with doubts resolved in favor
of intervention. 63 This interpretive principle harmonizes with the
intention to liberalize intervention expressed in the 1966
amendments. 64 However, not all courts accept this interpretation. The
Fifth Circuit rejected this interpretation in United States v. Texas
East Transmission Corp., reaching back to before 1966 and borrowing
the intervention standard of Stadin v. Union Electric Co. 65 Although
the Fifth Circuit recognized that the 1966 amendments changed
certain elements of the Rule, such as the requirement of being bound
by a judgment, it did not agree that the 1966 amendments intended to
liberalize the general construction of Rule 24 to what the circuit
termed "indiscriminate intervention." 66
1. Timeliness Requirement
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 requires that intervention
must be made "on [a] timely motion."67 Instead of stating a specific,
fixed amount of time in which a motion must be made for it to be
timely, the timeliness requirement is a flexible inquiry with multiple
factors that should be used to accomplish "the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." 68 Courts often interpret
the timeliness requirement especially leniently in motions for

61. While permissive intervention may be attempted in public law cases, ultimately it's
designed to give judges wide discretion to allow or deny intervention. Because of this discretion,
permissive intervention is not robust enough to provide a meaningful vehicle for public law
intervention.
62. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1908 (discussing
requirements of intervention of right).
63. See, e.g., South Dakota ex rel. Barnett v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 785 (8th
Cir. 2003) ("Rule 24 should be liberally construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the
proposed intervenor.").
64. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
65. See United States v. Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410, 413 (1991) (citing
Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 918 (8th Cir. 1962)) (discussing bounds set by Rule 24).
66. Id.
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
68. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970).
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intervention of right.69 This is a sensible result considering a court has
less discretion in the context of intervention of right-if an absent
party meets the requirements, it must be allowed to intervene. 70
Nonetheless, even in intervention of right, a court does have
appreciable discretion in determining whether or not a motion is
timely.7 '
While the timeliness requirement is difficult to define, courts
consistently look at certain factors. Unsurprisingly, the most
recognizable factor is simply the amount of time elapsed since the
beginning of the litigation. 72 The Fifth Circuit in Smith Petroleum
Service, Inc. v. Monsanto Chemical Co. emphasized that the amount of
time elapsed was a "relevant" consideration, but not controlling-the
decision regarding timeliness should be made based on the totality of
the circumstances.73 The D.C. Circuit has gone so far as to state that
while the elapsed time is relevant, it alone cannot make a motion for
intervention untimely.74
The second factor for deciding timeliness is the delay between
when a proposed intervenor learns of the suit and when the intervenor
actually files a motion to intervene.75 Some courts have held this
requirement also applies when a group should have known that a suit
would affect its interest.76 Much like the first factor, there is no
specific time period that will or will not make a motion timely.77

69. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1916 n.5 ("The timeliness requirement for a
motion to intervene is often applied less strictly with respect to intervention of right.").
70. See id. (discussing different standards of "timeliness" between intervention of right and
permissive intervention).
71. See R & G Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009)
("[Elven in the case of a motion to intervene as of right, the district court's discretion is
appreciable, and the timeliness requirement retains considerable bite.").
72. See, e.g., Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1115 (5th
Cir. 1970) (considering whether a motion filed nineteen months after the litigation commenced
was timely).
73. Id.
74. See United States v. British Am. Tobacco Austl. Servs., Ltd., 437 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) ("[E]1apsed time alone may not make a motion for intervention untimely... .").
75. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1916 n.9 (citing several cases where parties'
motions for intervention were granted when the party moved to intervene promptly after
learning of lawsuit); see also, e.g., Trans Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat'l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 332
F.3d 815 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding a motion filed one and a half years after the absentee was
aware of the suit was untimely).
76. See, e.g., Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 316 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A
prospective intervenor must move promptly to intervene as soon as it knows or has reason to
know that its interests might be adversely affected.").
77. See British Am. Tobacco, 437 F.3d at 1239 (holding no specific amount of elapsed time
inherently makes a motion untimely).
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Additionally, even a significant delay may be justified by a
"satisfactory explanation for the delay."78
The final, and most significant, factor in determining
timeliness is balancing the prejudice that would result to the parties
by granting or denying intervention.79 This determination considers
not only the prejudicial impact of granting intervention to the parties
already in the suit, but also the impact on absentees.80 One of the
most common forms of prejudice occurs when an absentee seeks to
intervene close to the conclusion of a case, such as during a trial or
settlement negotiations. 8 '
2. Sufficient-Interest Requirement
In addition to the threshold requirement of timeliness, Rule 24
requires that a proposed intervenor "claim[] an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action." 82 Despite
being a crucial question, most commentators agree that the Supreme
Court has never articulated a clear standard for the sufficient-interest
requirement. 83 In Donaldson v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that the sufficient-interest requirement obviously means a
"significantly protectable interest";84 however, the circuits are split on
what interests qualify as significantly protectable and whether that
definition even helps to clarify the text of Rule 24's sufficient-interest
clause.85
The Court first considered the revised sufficient-interest
requirement in Cascade Natural Gas Corporation v. El Paso Natural
Gas Company.86 The Court recognized that the new, post-1966
standard was more liberal than that in the previous Rule and
78. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding no explanation for
delay in seeking intervention).
79. See McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1970) ("In fact, this
[prejudice] may well be the only significant consideration when the proposed intervenor seeks
intervention of right.").
80. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding
a district court must consider prejudice to present parties and the absentee).
See, e.g., id. at 1517 (considering the prejudice resulting from intervening after a trial
81.
and a settlement negotiation).
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
83. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1908.1 (arguing there is no clear definition).
84. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971).
85. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1908.1 ("[T]here is sufficient room for
disagreement about what it means so that this gloss on the rule is not likely to provide any more
guidance than does the bare term 'interest' used in Rule 24 itself.").
86. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 132-36
(1967) (discussing the sufficient-interest requirement of Rule 24).
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concluded that it was "broad enough to include" the proposed
intervenor.87 Apart from this one line, the Court offered no guidance to
interpreting the sufficient-interest requirement. However, the nature
of the allowed interest in that case is instructive in and of itself: the
allowed intervenor, Cascade, did not have an interest under the Rule
before the 1966 amendments and did not have an independently
sufficient claim.88 Cascade was an Oregon company that sought to
intervene in an antitrust action between two California companies. 89
Cascade regularly purchased natural gas from one of the companies
and intervened in the suit only because it thought the suit's resolution
could impact its supply and pricing.90 While the majority easily
approved of this interest with virtually no discussion, the dissent
referred to this as an "insubstantial" interest. 91 This analysis suggests
that, while the Cascade Court did not concretely state a test for
determining a sufficient interest, its concept of interest was so broad
that even this seemingly borderline case was easily accepted.
Four years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the
sufficient-interest requirement in Donaldson v. United States,92 this
time finding that the proposed intervenor lacked a sufficient interest
for intervention. 93 The case involved a summons issued by the IRS to
Donaldson's former employer for various financial documents related
to Donaldson's employment. 94 To prevent the employer from
complying with the IRS by producing the documents, Donaldson
moved to intervene in order to oppose the summons.95 The Court
emphasized that the employer had no fiduciary relationship with
Donaldson that could prevent it from complying with the IRS. 96 The
Court identified Donaldson's interest as "nothing more than a desire
by Donaldson to counter and overcome [the employer's] willingness,
under summons, to comply and to produce records." 97 Thus, the Court
concluded that the nature of Donaldson's interest was insufficient for
intervention since it could be thwarted by any number of means even
87.

Id. at 136.

88. See id. at 154 (discussing the nature of Cascade's interest).
89. Id. at 132-33.
90. Id. at 133.
91. Compare id. at 136 (cursorily concluding that the amendments to Rule 24 makes it
broad enough to include Cascade), with id. at 154 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing Cascade's
interest as less substantial than the remote and general concerns of other parties).
92. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 518-19.
95. Id. at 520-21.
96. Id. at 523.
97. Id. at 531.
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if Donaldson successfully defeated the IRS summons in court. 98 The
Court explained that the sufficient-interest requirement means a
"significantly protectable interest,"99 a phrase which has created
confusion in intervention law. 100 Since the phrase neither qualifies as
a term of art nor reflects any clear doctrine from earlier intervention
law, lower courts are split on its application. 101
3. Practical-Effect Requirement
Rule 24 also requires that a proposed intervenor demonstrate
"that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the movant's ability to protect its interest." 102 Unlike the
substantial-interest and adequacy-of-representation requirements, the
practical-effect requirement has created little debate. Originally, the
drafted rule would have required "that the judgment 'substantially'
impair or impede the interest"; however, this higher standard was
dropped before final approval. 103 Although the Advisory Committee
Notes to the 1966 Amendments still reference a requirement of being
"substantially affected" and "substantially impaired," 104 courts have
not applied a heightened standard.105
Ultimately, the goal behind the new practical-effect
requirement was to repeal the res judicata rule developed in Sam
Fox.106 In addition, the amendments seems to have completely shifted
the rule to allowing any effect on the intervenor, even if only that of
stare decisis.107 This movement was quite likely accomplished by the

98. See id. ("The nature of the 'interest' urged by the taxpayer is apparent from the fact
that the material in question (once we assume its relevance) would not be subject to suppression
if the Government obtained it by other routine means . . .
99. Id.
100. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1908.1.
101. See Appel, supra note 9, at 263 ("[The term 'significantly protectable interest' neither
derives from any earlier intervention jurisprudence, nor adds anything to the analysis of what
constitutes the necessary interest to warrant intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)."); infra Part III.B
(discussing the circuit split over conceptions of a sufficient interest).

102. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
103. Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (citing Sherman L. Cohn, The New
FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1232 (1966)).
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee notes to the 1966 amendments.
105. See, e.g., Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 701 (discussing the phenomena but declining to apply a
heightened standard).
106. Atlantis Dev. Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 823-24 (5th Cir. 1967).
107. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
potential stare decisis effect on the judgment in the case would impair the absentee's interest).
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very early case of Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States.108
While stare decisis will normally suffice for a finding of practical
effect, the requirement is not without some bite, and there must be
some connection between the resolution of the case and an impairment
of the intervenor's interest.109
4. Adequacy-of-Representation Requirement
An absentee that fulfills the first three requirements of Rule 24
is entitled to intervene "unless existing parties adequately represent
that interest."110 This final requirement is arguably the most complex,
and only one Supreme Court case, Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of
America,11' has addressed the issue. Moreover, this requirement is
complicated by two different burden-shifting standards, and the
federal courts of appeals are split as to what circumstances trigger
such burden shifting. 112
Although the Supreme Court did not lay out a comprehensive
analysis of the adequacy-of-representation requirement in Trbovich, it
did provide two central principles for this analysis. First, the Court
stated that while a proposed intervenor bears the burden of proof, it is
sufficient to prove that representation " 'may be' inadequate"-an
intervenor does not have to prove that representation will in fact be
inadequate.113 Second, the Court established that the burden of
showing that representation may be inadequate "should be treated as
minimal."114 While most courts have acknowledged this minimal
standard in some form, many have tried to weaken the principle's
import by rephrasing the requirement." 5 Instead of requiring a
minimal burden of proof that representation may be inadequate-the
Supreme Court's standard-the courts of appeals usually state that
the inadequate representation is already minimal because the

108. See generally Federal Civil Procedure:PrejudicialEffects of Stare Decisis Can Compel
Intervention of Right Under Rule 24(a), supra note 28 (arguing for the practical effect of stare
decisis based on Atlantis).
109. See Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 1988) (limiting a
party's ability to intervene as a matter of right based on the claim of stare decisis without close
factual connection).
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).

111. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
112. See infra note 187-203 and accompanying text (explaining the circuits' different
approaches).
113. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Ne. Ohio Coal. for Homeless & Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d
999, 1007 (6th Cir. 2006) (rephrasing the Supreme Court's requirement).
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intervenor only needs to prove that representation may be inadequate,
not that it is in fact inadequate.116 While subtle, this phraseology
clearly attempts to create a higher standard than the, literally,
minimal one established by the Supreme Court.
Beyond the Supreme Court's approach, the courts of appeals
use a system of presumptions in analyzing the adequacy-ofrepresentation requirement. If the absent party is either sufficiently
represented by a current party or the government is a party to the
suit, then the court will presume the absent party is already
adequately represented.117

III. ANALYSIS

OF RULE 24(A)(2) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT

The courts of appeals are split over how to apply Rule 24 in two
areas: the sufficient-interest requirement and the adequacy-ofrepresentation requirement. These divergent applications are a
product of strained attempts to avoid a lenient standard for
intervention in smaller private cases. 118 While these circuit splits
create confusion for all litigants, the result is especially problematic
for public-law cases.
This Part begins in Section A by providing an analytical
framework arguing that the purpose of intervention is different in
public-law cases than in private-law cases. Section B then uses this
framework to analyze and critique how courts have applied both the
sufficient-interest and adequacy-of-representation requirements.
A. The Purpose of Intervention in Public-Law Cases
Despite the broad intervention standard of Rule 24, the courts
of appeals often contrive an interpretation that is much more
narrow.119 This departure from the Rule's original purpose is not
always without valid cause. Despite the many benefits of intervention,
in some private-law cases a broad intervention standard could create
inefficiency by overcomplicating a suit with tangentially related
issues.120 This inefficiency provides the rationale for many of the
116. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he requirement of impairment of a legally protected interest is a
minimal one: the requirement is met if the applicant shows 'that representation of his interest
"may be" inadequate.' ").
117. See discussion infra Parts III.C.1.a-c (explaining the presumption system).
118. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the relevant differences between public law
and private law in the context of intervention).
119. See discussion infra Parts III.B.2, CD.2 (criticizing this approach).
120. See Appel, supra note 9, at 301 (advocating for limited intervention rules to prevent
burdening the original parties).
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circuits' contrived interpretations. 12 1 The possible inefficiency has also
been noted by academics, especially those who argue that the current
standard for intervening is appropriately narrow. 122 However, the
relevant considerations in balancing the correct level of complexity are
markedly different between public- and private-law cases.
First, in a public-law case it may not be appropriate to value
the plaintiffs interest in the suit's resolution above that of other
parties. As previously discussed, the 1966 amendments to Rule 24
already indicated that this norm of plaintiff primacy was losing
importance. 123 This concept has special force in public-law litigation.
While the plaintiff may be seeking a specific personal interest, the
inherent nature of a public-law suit is that it implicates a wider
variety of public interests. 124 Public-law cases in a given area will
often involve many similar legal and factual questions; thus,
resolution of one suit is more likely to impact the unrepresented
parties through stare decisis.125 These factors indicate that in many
public-law cases, the absent parties are much more likely to have a
sufficient interest that would allow them to "be presumptively entitled
to participate in the suit on demand."126
Second, public-law litigation can be perceived as undermining
the democratic ideal of equal participation in government, since the
resolution of public-law litigation inherently has wide societal
impacts.127 These cases, especially those litigated under such broad
provisions as the Fourteenth Amendment, often resolve issues that
are the subject of wide political discussion. 128 Furthermore, these
decisions may often rest less on pure textual analysis and more on
weighing competing policies or value judgments. 129 Although much
121. See, e.g., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (discussing the need to
balance intervention with decreased efficiency from complex litigation).
122. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1312 (arguing that a party structure must provide
adequate representation for public law cases without introducing too much complexity). See
generally Appel, supra note 9, passim (defending the current limits on intervention).
123. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing how the amended Rules recognized
a broader range of interests in a given lawsuit).
124. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1310 ("Tublic law litigation, because of its widespread
impact, seems to call for adequate representation in the proceedings of the range of interests that
will be affected by them.").
125. See Jenkins, supra note 45, at 292-93 (discussing how the legal holdings and factual
findings of a public law case can play a significant negative stare decisis role even if the result of
the case is not itself relevant to the absentee's interest).
126. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1310.
127. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
128. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1288-90 (discussing the interaction between political
action and intervention).
129. Id. at 1288-89.
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could be said to critique this situation where "[1]itigation inevitably
becomes an explicitly political forum and the court a visible arm of the
political process,"130 allowing intervention can at least ensure full
representation in these proceedings. This shift helps return civil
litigation to "what it should represent in a modern democratic
society."131 While courts may properly strike down even democratically
created laws deemed unconstitutional, in these cases it is important to
allow wide public intervention both to ensure the court sees the best
possible representation of interests and to defeat the public
perception-accurate or not-that the court is undermining the
democratic process through limited litigation.
Third, concerns regarding efficiency weigh differently in the
public-law context. As Professor Alan Jenkins has noted, the interest
in efficiency is forward-looking-how can the resolution of this case
prevent unnecessary cases in the future?13 2 While adding additional
parties to the current litigation may slightly increase the complexity of
a current case, it can dramatically assist in reducing future case loads.
This is especially significant in the context of public-law litigation
because the disputed issues are more likely to turn on similar legal
questions than various divergent factual disputes. In Trbovich, the
Supreme Court highlighted that the similarity of the intervenor's
arguments meant that intervention would produce "relatively little
additional burden." 133 The various parties to a public-law case are
more likely to share common issues than the individuals who may
attempt to intervene in a private-law case. Furthermore, grouping
multiple suits into one through intervention allows a court to better
understand the interests at stake, thus reducing the risk of creating
inconsistent judgments.134
Fourth, public-law cases receive greater informational benefits
from intervenors. The intervenors in public-law litigation are normally
public interest groups.135 These groups are often composed of
specialists in the respective areas in which they seek to intervene.136
This high-quality representation can provide the court with unique

130. Id. at 1304.

131. Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, CORNELL
L. REV. 270, 329 (1989).
132. Jenkins, supra note 45, at 279 (arguing the judicial economy seeks to diminish future
litigation by nonparties who have an interest in the current suit).
133. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1972).
134. See Vreeland, supra note 13, at 295-96 (discussing the importance of providing the
court with complete information).
135. Id. at 295.
136. Id.
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evidence and arguments. 8 7 These contributions preserve
adversarial process by ensuring complete representation. 1 38

the

B. Different Approaches to the Sufficient-Interest Requirement
The first of the two main circuit splits in interpreting the
standard for intervention involves the sufficient-interest requirement.
This Section analyzes the circuits' conflicting interpretations and
critiques them in light of the purpose of intervention in public-law
cases.
1. Explanation of the Approaches to the Sufficient-Interest
Requirement
The circuits' approaches to the sufficient-interest requirement
can be divided into three categories: (1) those requiring a protectable
interest; 139 (2) those requiring a direct, substantial, and legally
protectable interest; 140 and (3) those relying on policy interests to
make the decision. 141 While this breakdown represents the overall
landscape, these interpretations often operate more as general
guidelines than hard-and-fast rules. 142 In fact, it is not uncommon to
find cases within one circuit that seem to apply the requirement more
or less stringently based on the policy interests present in the case. 143
a. Sufficiency of a ProtectableInterest
The first group of courts focuses not on whether the intervenor has a
specific legal cause of action, but on whether the interest is one
recognized by the law.144 The Ninth Circuit specifically formulates this
test by finding that an interest is sufficient when "the interest is
137. Jenkins, supra note 45, at 278.
138. Id.; see also Chayes, supra note 1, at 1310-11 (discussing the importance of being able
to rely on sufficient party participation for the viability of both affected interests and for the
judicial system itself).
139. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring a
significantly protectable interest), overruled in part by Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630
F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011).
140. See, e.g., Diaz v. S. Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir. 1970) (requiring a
direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings).
141. See, e.g., Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding the sufficientinterest requirement balances policy goals).
142. Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir. 1987).
143. See, e.g., id. at 596-97 (holding this analysis often requires pragmatic considerations).
144. See, e.g. Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011)
(discussing the necessary interest).
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protectable under some law, and that there is a relationship between
145
the legally protected interest and the claims at issue." This test does
not require that the alleged interest be protected by the statute at
issue in the litigation. 146 While not clearly articulated in Sierra Club v.
Equal Protection Agency, the Ninth Circuit's analysis seems to
construe the sufficient-interest requirement not so much as seeking a
specific "legal or equitable interest," 147 but rather as asking whether
there is some interest generally recognized by law that bears a
relationship to the claims at issue.148 In Donnelly v. Glickman, the
court held that this relationship requirement is generally satisfied if
49
the resolution of the claim will actually affect the intervenor.1 For
example, the Donnelly court found that the proposed intervenor did
not have an interest because the relationship was nonexistentwhether the intervenor was successful or not, the result of the
litigation would not affect the intervenor's interest. 50 Thus, the
interest requirement is little more than "a practical, threshold
inquiry."15 1
b. Sufficiency of a Direct, Substantial, and Legally Protectable
Interest
Courts using the second approach require a direct, substantial,
52
and legally protectable interest in the litigation to intervene.1 This
145. Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993).
146. Id.
147. Cnty. of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980).
148. The crucial elements of Sierra Club are not easy to interpret. In the same sentence in
which the court specifies that an interest only needs to be "protectable under some law," it also
states that there must be "a relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at
issue." Sierra Club, 955 F.2d at 1484. The words legally protected interest" seem to indicate the
court is interpreting "significantly protectable interest" as requiring a specific legal claim;
however, this interpretation conflicts with the court's later analysis where it finds a sufficient
interest without a specific legal cause of action merely because the interest (the ability to
discharge pollution) is recognized by the Clean Water Act (meaning it regulates what discharges
are permissible). Id. at 1485. Based on this analysis the words "legally protected" might better be
interpreted to mean "legally recognized." In other words, the question is not whether the
intervenor can bring a legal suit to protect the interest, but whether some law has recognized it
as an interest. This understanding is most readily reconcilable with the Ninth Circuit's later
cases specifying that "Rule 24(a)(2) does not require a specific legal or equitable interest."
Wilderness Soc'y, 630 F.3d at 1179.
149. Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 410 (9th Cir. 1998).
150. See id. ("Resolution of plaintiffs' action, therefore, will not affect the proposed
intervenors' claims . . . . Thus, the proposed intervenors do not have a 'significant protectable
interest' in the liability phase of plaintiffs' action.").
151. Greene v. United States, 996 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1993).
152. See, e.g., Diaz v. S. Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing Hobson v.
Hansen, 44 F.R.D. 18, 24 (D.D.C. 1968)). While the D.C. District Court case Hobson v. Hansen is
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interpretation not only requires that the intervenor's interest be
directly and substantially related to the question of the litigation, but
also that it has "a right to maintain a claim for the relief sought."153
Most courts that use this interpretation require the proposed
intervenor to be able to bring a suit independently; in other words, the
intervenor must have a personal cause of action.154
This interpretation of the sufficient-interest requirement
creates a notably narrow standard of intervention, which conflicts
5 Courts using
with the broader standard in other circuits.16
this
approach have been generally unwilling to deviate, even in public-law
cases where a public interest group seeks to represent a public
interest in the litigation. 56
c. The Public-PolicyApproach
Courts using the third approach to the sufficient-interest
requirement lack a clearly defined test; they look instead to public
policy to answer whether the specific interest identified is sufficient to
warrant intervention.15 7 In using this approach, the D.C. Circuit in
Nuesse v. Camp stated that "the 'interest' test is primarily a practical
guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently

normally cited as precedent for this view, the standard is clearly derived from a line of cases
predating the 1966 amendments. See Hobson, 44 F.R.D. at 23 (discussing pre-1966 cases that
created this standard). Interesting to note, Hobson itself is no longer controlling in the D.C.
Circuit. See Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding the sufficient-interest
requirement does not require any specific legal interest). Additionally, while many of the cases
seem to read this standard as an interpretation of the Donaldson "significantly protectable"
language, both the tripartite standard and the Hobson case pre-date Donaldson. See New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984) ("It is
apparent that the Supreme Court in Donaldson used 'protectable' in the sense of legally
protectable, and it is difficult to conceive of any other sense in which the Court might have been
employing 'protectable' in that context.").
153. Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union, 440 F.2d 124, 132 (8th Cir. 1971).
154. This seems to be the requirement of at least the Seventh Circuit. See e.g., Heyman v.
Nat'l Bank of Chi., 615 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding there was no interest since the
intervenor could not bring suit separately). However, the Fifth Circuit has recognized
intervention in cases where the proposed intervenor did not have a legal cause of action to bring
a separate claim, but nonetheless did have an interest in property that was the subject of
litigation. See Diaz, 427 F.2d at 1124 (allowing intervention to place a tax lien on a piece of
property involved in the litigation).
155. See United States v. Perry Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting
the Fifth Circuit's narrow reading of the sufficient-interest requirement).
156. See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting public interest
organization's argument that the sufficient-interest requirement should be relaxed in public law
cases).
157. See, e.g., Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700 (stating a flexible test for intervention).
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concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process."1ss
Thus, this approach entirely eschews the requirement of any specific
legal interest, instead focusing on the relationship element-whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus to warrant efficient intervention.
Courts following this approach acknowledge that rules are "obviously
tailored to fit ordinary civil litigation, these provisions (of Rule 24)
require other than literal application in atypical cases." 15 9 The
discretionary nature of this interpretation of the sufficient-interest
requirement means that thorough analysis and consistent application
is difficult at best. 60
2. Critique of the Approaches
While none of the interpretations of the sufficient-interest
requirement perfectly fulfill the purposes of Rule 24 and the Supreme
Court precedent discussed above, the public-policy approach comes the
closest.
Courts have critiqued the lack of a definition of the word
"interest" in Rule 24;161 one court commented that "the amendments
made the question of what constitutes an 'interest' more visible
without contributing an answer."162 The legislative history of the 1966
amendments does not reveal whether the ambiguity is accidental or if
the word "interest" is supposed to have a narrower meaning. Before
the 1966 amendments, the Rule included two specific types of
interests that were sufficient: an interest in being bound by a suit or
an interest in property involved in the suit.163 The 1966 amendments
64
completely removed the restrictions on a sufficient interest.1
Furthermore, the interest requirement's objective wording (requiring
that a prospective intervenor is or may be affected) changed to a
subjective wording (requiring that a prospective intervenor claim to
have an interest). These changes suggest that the 1966 amendments
intentionally left the word "interest" undefined. The amended Rule 24
was designed to eliminate the res judicata rule established in Sam

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en bane) ("Since this task will
depend upon the contours of the particular controversy, general rules and past decisions cannot
provide uniformly dependable guides.").
161. See, e.g., id. (noting the ambiguity of what constitutes a sufficient interest).
162. Id.
163. FED. R. C1V. P. 24 (amended 1966).
164. Id.
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Fox.165 Under the modern approach, the focus of the Rule is not
whether the intervenor has a specific type of interest, but rather
whether the claimed interest "relat[es] to the property or transaction
that is the subject of the action." 166
This view is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. In
Cascade, the Court did not view the sufficient-interest requirement as
a difficult standard to meet. Rather, it noted the clear change from the
previous Rule and casually assumed that Cascade had a sufficient
interest to intervene under the modern Rule. The case does not
indicate that Cascade had any legal claims against the parties to the
suit. Rather the court conclusorily allowed intervention on the
"unsubstantial" claim that the adjudication of the antitrust suit at
issue may tangentially impact the prices Cascade received when
purchasing natural gas from one of the parties to the suit. If the
sufficient-interest requirement did require a direct, substantial, and
legally protectable interest, Cascade should not have been allowed to
intervene.
In contrast, proponents of a limited interpretation of Rule 24's
sufficient-interest
requirement often point to Donaldson's
"significantly protectable interest" language to show that the correct
standard for intervention is narrow. However, this conclusion is
neither necessary nor obvious from the opinion. First, as already
mentioned, this phrase is not a term of art, and the Court did not
explain what it meant by "significantly protectable." Second, in
Donaldson, the Court did not discuss whether Donaldson's claimed
interest in protecting evidence of tax fraud was a sufficient type of
interest. Rather, the Court discussed whether that interest was
sufficiently related to the suit. The Court concluded that Donaldson's
interest in protecting his record was not sufficiently related to the suit
because his interest was not "significantly protectable" through the
litigation-even if he was allowed to intervene and won on every issue,
the employer could still voluntarily give his records to the IRS.
Under this analysis, both the "substantially protectable
interest" and the "direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest"
approaches seem incorrect since they require a specific type of interest
for intervention. If the drafters intended to impose these
requirements, they could have easily required a substantial or
significant interest. Rather, the intent of this provision seems to be
filtering out interests based on whether they are sufficiently related to
165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee note on the 1966 amendment (outlining the
goal of expanding the breadth of a sufficient interest).
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
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the suit and whether intervention can "significantly protect" the
claimed interest.
C. Different Approaches to the Adequacy-of-Representation
Requirement
The second main circuit split in interpreting the standard for
intervention focuses on what a proposed intervenor must prove to
show that the present parties do not adequately represent its interest.
This Section first explains the various approaches to this requirement
and then analyzes how these standards deviate from Rule 24's original
intent.
1. Explanation of the Approaches to the Adequacy-of-Representation
Requirement
The courts of appeals use a system of presumptions in
analyzing the adequacy-of-representation requirement: if the absent
party is sufficiently represented by a current party or if the
government is a party to the suit, then the court will presume the
absent party is already adequately represented. Although the courts of
appeals consistently use these presumptions, the requirements to
trigger and overcome the presumptions vary by circuit.
a. Presumption of Adequate Representationfrom Similar Interest
Courts are split on the correct standard for establishing the
first type of presumption-that of adequate representation from a
party already present in the litigation. 167 One group of courts uses a
three-part spectrum test; the others use a same-ultimate-objective
test.168

The three-part spectrum test first categorizes an absentee's
interest as adverse, similar, or identical to parties already present in
the suit. If a proposed intervenor has an identical interest to a party
in the suit, then a presumption of adequate representation arises. 169
However, the opposite is not true-being adverse to both parties in a
167. Compare Bottoms v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1986) (asking
whether the proposed intervenor has an identical interest), with B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc. v.
Kellogg USA, Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 546 (1st Cir. 2006) (asking whether the proposed intervenor
shares the same ultimate objective with a party to the suit).
168. Compare Bottoms, 797 F.2d at 872 (describing the three spectrum test), with B.
Fernandez,440 F.3d at 546 (outlining the same ultimate objective test).
169. See Bottoms, 797 F.2d at 872 ("[I]n this type of case, the party's representation is
presumptively adequate.").
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suit does not mean that a presumption of inadequate representation is
created. So, many courts simply ask whether the proposed intervenor
has an identical interest to a party already in the litigation. 170
The same-ultimate-objective test creates a rebuttable
presumption of adequate representation whenever an absentee shares
the same ultimate objective with a party. '1 This inquiry asks whether
parties "seek to achieve the same objectives" as an existing party. 7 2
The degree of relationship between the two parties is not
determinative. For example, two different branches of the same
company have been found not to have the same ultimate objective,
while a machinists union and the Federal Election Commission
("FEC")-two unrelated parties-were held to have the same objective
when they both sought to protect the constitutionality of a statute. 173
Courts applying the same-ultimate-objective test struggle with
defining a party's objective at the correct level of generality. Analyzed
under a low view of generality, the parties only need to be pursuing
some generally common goal. In contrast, the higher-level analysis
takes a closer look to see if the parties really have the same ultimate
goal or different goals that simply share some common elements.
For example, in the Eleventh Circuit case Athens Lumber
Company v. Federal Election Commission, a machinists union
attempted to distinguish its ultimate objective from that of the FEC
by arguing that its interest was to prevent members from being
"financially overwhelmed in federal elections," whereas the FEC was
simply seeking to uphold the constitutionality of a law.174 This
argument is strikingly similar to that which the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Trbovich. In Trbovich, the Secretary of Labor
asserted an identical interest-at a low level of generality-as a union
member because they were both seeking free, democratic union
elections. 75 However, the Court-applying a high-level-of-generality
analysis-found that the union member was not adequately
170. See, e.g., id. (failing to consider whether the interest was adverse or similar).
171. Fernandez, 440 F.3d at 546.
172. United States v. City of Miami, 278 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2002).
173. Compare Fernandez,440 F.3d at 546 (holding Kellogg USA and Kellogg Caribbean did
not have the same ultimate objective), with Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding machinists union and FEC shared the same
ultimate objective).
174. See Athens Lumber, 690 F.2d at 1366 (discussing the machinists union's claimed
objective).
175. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972) ("The Secretary
contends that petitioner's only legally cognizable interest is the interest of all union members in
democratic elections, and he says that interest is identical with the interest represented by the
Secretary in Title IV litigation.").
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represented because he had a personal goal separate from the
1 6 Despite this
Secretary who was just "performing his duties."<
reasoning from Trbovich, the Eleventh Circuit in Athens Lumber
applied a low-level-of-generality analysis and found that the
machinists union and the FEC shared the same ultimate objective;
thus, it denied intervention. 7 7
b. Presumption of Adequate Representationfrom Government
Participation
The second circumstance when a court will find a presumption
of adequate representation is when the government is involved to
some degree in the litigation.'78 While Professor Appel has argued that
the presumption from government intervention is weakening, more
recent cases suggest the contrary. 79 Every circuit Professor Appel
cited as evidence of this change has since reiterated a strong
presumption of adequate representation from government parties. 180
176. Id. at 538-39.
177. See Athens Lumber, 690 F.2d at 1366 (holding the machinists union and FEC had the
same ultimate objective).
178. See, e.g., Ruthdart v. United States, 303 F.3d 375, 386 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Adequacy is
presumed, although rebuttably so, where a government agency is the representative party.").
179. See Appel, supra note 9, at 274 ("[C]ourts formerly applied a strong presumption that a
government adequately represented any party aligned with its interests .

. .

. More courts now

recognize that outsiders may have interests that a government would overlook or fail to
emphasize.").
180. Compare Appel, supra note 9, at 274 & n.317 (citing the Ninth, Fifth, Eighth, and First
Circuits as evidence of a shift), with Dep't of Fair Emp't & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d
728, 740 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[flt will be presumed that a state adequately represents its citizens ...
."), and Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. North Little Rock Sch. Dist., 378 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir. 2004)
("We presume that the government entity adequately represents the public. . . ."), and Ruthdart,
303 F.3d at 386 ("Adequacy is presumed, although rebuttably so, where a government agency is
the representative party."). For example, the Ninth Circuit formerly dictated a low standard
without a presumption stating "where the government was the purported representative, we
have held that 'the requirement of inadequacy of representation is satisfied if the applicant
shows that representation of its interests "may be" inadequate and ... the burden of making that
showing is minimal.' " United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1986) (alteration
in original), vacated sub nom., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370
(1987); see also Jenkins, supra note 45, at 297 (discussing Stringfellow as an example of a court
that has not followed the higher standard set by other courts of appeals). In reaching this
standard, the Court explicitly dismissed the higher standard imposed by other circuits, citing
Trbovich as authority. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at 827 ("[The district court applied the standard of
United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., under which an applicant must make a
'strong showing' of inadequate representation when the purported representative is a state or the
federal government. However, this standard clearly conflicts with the law of this circuit.
Consistent with Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America . . . ." (citations omitted)). In
contrast to Stringfellow, and apparently ignoring the previous interpretation of Trbovich, the
Ninth Circuit now holds that "[i]n the absence of a 'very compelling showing to the contrary,' it
will be presumed that a state adequately represents its citizens . . . ."Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324
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These cases lend credence to the argument that the presumption of
adequate representation based on government participation is not
shrinking, but actually growing.
Although courts universally apply some presumption of
adequate representation from a government party, there is no
consensus as to exactly what the government must do to create the
presumption. The broadest theory of the government presumption
assumes that the government-as parens patriae-inherently
represents the interest of the public. 181 Thus, unless the absentee can
assert an interest separate from that of the general public, the
presumption of adequacy will apply. 182
A more moderate theory of the government presumption
assumes the government provides adequate representation if the
proposed intervenor "shares the same interest" as the state. 183 The
results of this test are likely to vary depending on the specific
interpretation of "interest" used in sufficient-interest-requirement
analysis.184
Finally, the most narrow view of the government presumption
applies only when the "representative is a governmental body charged
by law with protecting the interests of the proposed intervenors." 185
This presumption applies "unless there is a showing of gross
negligence or bad faith." 186
c. Overcoming the Presumption
Once a court finds that a proposed intervenor is presumed to be
adequately represented, the intervenor must meet some higher
requirement to overcome the presumption. However, the requirement
and its operation are unclear. Oftentimes, presumptions shift the
burden of proof;187 however, in intervention practice, the burden of
F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1909, at 332 (2d ed. 1986)).
181. See Little Rock Sch. Dist., 378 F.3d at 780 ("We presume that the government entity
adequately represents the public . . . .").
182. See id. ("[W]e require the party seeking to intervene to make a strong showing of
inadequate representation; for example, it may show that its interests are distinct and cannot be
subsumed within the public interest represented by the government entity.").
183. See Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086 ("[I]t will be presumed that a state adequately
represents its citizens when the applicant shares the same interest.").
184. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (describing the various "interest"
requirements employed by the circuits).
185. Ligas ex rel. Foster v. Maram, 478 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2007).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (noting that presumptions often
shift the burden of proof).
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proof is already on the proposed intervenor.18 8 While the exact theory
behind this presumption will be critiqued later in this Note,18 9 it is
instructive at this point to analyze what will overcome the
presumption of adequate representation. The circuits are split, with
some applying a weak presumption that can be easily overcome and
some applying a strong one that requires a "compelling showing" of
inadequate representation.19 0 The approaches are hard to categorize,
but this Note will group courts into those that apply one of two
multifactor tests and those that fail to articulate a clear test.
The first group of courts requires an absentee to prove
"adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance on the part of a party
to the suit" in order to overcome the presumption of adequate
representation. 191 This multifactor test is a relic from pre-1966
cases, 192 normally applied when the presumption was derived from
sharing the same ultimate objective with a party already in the
litigation. 193 While most courts apply this test strictly, others indicate
that the listed factors are merely sufficient examples, but not
necessary requirements. 19 4
The second group of courts also requires consideration of three
factors, which the Ninth Circuit noted in Perry v. Proposition 8

Official Proponents:
(1) [W]hether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of
a proposed intervenor's arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing
to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer any
necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect. 195

188. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972).
189. See discussion infra Part III B.2.a (critiquing the presumption system).
190. Compare Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) ("This
presumption is weak . . . ."), with Dep't of Fair Emp't & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d
728, 740 (9th Cir. 2011) ("In the absence of a very compelling showing to the contrary, it will be
presumed that a state adequately represents its citizens . . . .").
191. E.g., In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 315 (3d Cir. 2005).
192. See e.g., Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 1962) ("[I1nadequacy of
representation is or may be shown by proof of collusion between the representative and an
opposing party, by the representative having or representing an interest adverse to the
intervener, or by the failure of the representative in the fulfillment of his duty."). But see Daggett
v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 111 (1st Cir. 1999)
(noting that courts may derive this standard from Stadin).
193. See e.g., Virginia. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976)
("When the party seeking intervention has the same ultimate objective as a party to the suit, a
presumption arises that its interests are adequately represented, against which the petitioner
must demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance.").
194. See Daggett, 172 F.3d at 111 (arguing this is not intended to be an exclusive list).
195. Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).
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While the first factor seems to indicate that a proposed
intervenor could defeat the presumption by proving some doubt that a
present party will make one of its arguments, courts do not appear to
follow this interpretation.19 6 For example, in Perry, the court first,
interpreted the word "arguments" as referring to broad claimspossibly even causes of action-not to specific arguments or legal
tactics. 97 Second, the court required a "compelling showing" of the
listed factors in order to defeat the presumption and establish
inadequate representation.198 In reconciling the "compelling showing"
language (which indicates a higher standard) with the "undoubtedly"
language (indicating a lower standard), it appears the court arrived at
a standard that asks in effect whether "a present party will make
substantially all of a proposed intervenor's significant arguments."
Courts that do not use these two main approaches have
employed a variety of requirements, although they have all been
applied inconsistently. Some courts have held that an intervenor need
only offer an adequate explanation as to why it is not sufficiently
represented by the named party in order to defeat the presumption of
adequate representation.199 This requirement seems to barely elevate
the requirement at all and is evident of a "weak" presumption. Other
courts are only slightly more demanding; they have required only that
a proposed intervenor show "some conflict" to defeat the
presumption. 200 On the far extreme, other courts have held that "gross
negligence or bad faith" is required to defeat the presumption,
although only in the case of a presumption arising from government
involvement. 201
d. Eliminatingthe Presumption
Assuming the presumption is overcome, or if the presumption
was never in place to begin with, the question remains: what is
sufficient to make the "minimal" showing that representation may be
inadequate? Ironically, courts have often used the same tests used to
overcome a presumption of adequate representation to analyze
whether or not representation is adequate even without the
196. See id. (denying intervention even when proposed intervenor provided concrete
examples of different arguments it would make).
197. See id. (holding that the absentee's arguments amounted to little more than litigation
tactics and were not sufficient to rebut presumption).
198. See id. (requiring a "compelling showing").
199. B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 546 (1st Cir. 2006).
200. Shea v. Angulo, 19 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1994).
201. Ligas ex rel. Foster v. Mara, 478 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2007).
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presumption. This raises questions of whether the presumption itself
is significant or whether the normal nonpresumption requirements
are higher than they should be. When courts don't borrow these
standards from the presumption analysis, they generally apply two
guidelines: first, differences in litigation strategy are insufficient to
find inadequate representation; 202 and second, a party's inability to
appeal an unfavorable judgment is also insufficient. 203
2. Critique of the Approaches
Both the presumption system applied by the courts of appeals
and the tests for applying the adequacy requirement fail to follow the
Supreme Court's precedent. As already noted, the Supreme Court has
not articulated a comprehensive analysis of the adequacy
requirement. 204 However, the Court has applied what it describes as a
"minimal" standard. 205 Not only is this minimal standard binding
precedent, it is also the best approach for judging the adequacy
requirement. Ultimately, the biggest danger to efficiency in
intervention is not multiple parties making similar arguments, but
multiple parties making different arguments that are not sufficiently
related to be efficiently resolved in the same litigation. 206 This is
intuitive: while a court might experience a marginal decline in
efficiency simply from reading briefs and hearing arguments that
contain some overlap, these costs are far less than the costs of parties
bringing in new, unrelated arguments for the court to adjudicate.
In contrast, the most efficient use of intervention is to allow
intervention for a party that is largely represented by current parties
but simply needs to advance one specific argument in order to protect
its interest. Again, this is intuitive: allowing intervention to a party
that brings multiple unique claims into the litigation may be only
moderately more efficient than if those claims were brought
separately. However, if a party merely intervenes to advance one
202. See, e.g., Perry, 587 F.3d at 952 (holding that the absentee's arguments amounted to
merely "litigation tactics," and were not sufficient to rebut presumption).
203. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 842 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding the possibility that the government would not appeal an adverse ruling was not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of adequate representation).
204. See discussion supra Part II.C.4 (describing the Supreme Court's adequacy
requirement).
205. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972); see also discussion
supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the Supreme Court's "minimal" standard).
206. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 ("Intervention by union members in a pending
enforcement suit, unlike initiation of a reparate suit, subjects the union to relatively little
additional burden.").
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specific argument and in doing so prevents the need for an entire
unique suit in the future, this intervention produces a significant
increase in efficiency. Thus, there is little reason for an overly zealous
adequacy requirement-allowing intervention to a party that is
already represented creates little additional cost.
Furthermore, the market already provides a regulating
mechanism to prevent unnecessary intervention. If a party is truly
adequately represented in the suit by other parties, then it would not
be willing to expend unnecessary resources to enter the litigation. 207
a. Critique of the Presumption System
The courts of appeals' presumption systems stand in opposition
to the Supreme Court's precedent developed in Trbovich.208 This
argument is most compelling in relation to the presumption from a
government party because that is the specific situation the Supreme
Court has addressed. 209 In Trbovich, the government was already a
party to the suit. 2 10 Furthermore, the government actor was also
legally charged with representing the intervenor. 211 Thus, this case
would trigger the government presumption under even the narrowest
test that requires the government to be charged with representing the
proposed intervenor. However, the Court did not apply a presumption
and only required the intervenor to make a minimal showing that the
government's representation may be inadequate. 212 To stress the

207. See David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and
Arbitrators,81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 747 (1968) (discussing how the costs of litigation can prevent
unnecessary intervention).
208. As previously mentioned, the mere existence of a presumption that triggers the
heightened standard inherently means a "minimal" standard is not being applied. See supra
notes 115-17 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between the standards of the
Supreme Court and courts of appeals). The minimal requirement cannot be reconciled with the
"compelling showing" or "bad faith" requirements under many of the circuits' presumptions. See
Jenkins, supra note 45, at 299 (arguing that the Supreme Court's minimal burden cannot be
reconciled with the circuits' heightened standards). Although the case has since been overruled,
in Stringfellow the Ninth Circuit adopted this logic and specifically stated that it could not adopt
a heightened standard and still follow the minimal standard required by Trbovich. See United
States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to adopt a presumption
creating a heightened standard), vacated sub nom., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in
Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987).
209. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n.10 (applying a minimal standard without a
presumption to a proposed intervenor where the government was already a party).
210. Id. at 529.
211. See id. at 538-39 (noting the government had the duty to represent the proposed
intervenor); see also Jenkins, supra note 45, at 299 (arguing the presumption system contradicts
Trbovich since the government was charged with representing the proposed intervenor).
212. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 & n.10

DUAL STANDARDS

2013]1

677

appropriateness of allowing intervention when a party is represented
by the government, the Court likened intervention to a party's right to
replace its counsel at will. 213
While Trbovich applies most directly to the government
presumption, it is also applicable to refuting the presumption of
adequate representation arising from a party with the same ultimate
objective. As already discussed, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the Secretary and proposed intervenor had the same general interest:
ensuring free union elections. 214 The Court noted this shared objective
but still held the Secretary was not an adequate representative. 2 15
Based on this analysis, both of the presumption standards conflict
with the Supreme Court's application of the "minimal" burden of
proving lack of adequate representation.
b. Critique of the Adequacy-of-RepresentationApproaches
While the presumption system may disregard the Supreme
Court's precedent, the various approaches used to adjudicate the
adequacy requirement also contradict the Court's minimal standard.
The most directly contradictory test is the "collusion, adversity, or
nonfeasance" test, which derives from cases predating the 1966
amendments. 216 Even before Cascade and Trbovich, this test was
critiqued by lower courts, which realized that many parties not falling
into one of these three categories may still not adequately represent
the interests of the proposed intervenor. 217 In Cascade, the Court
arguably ended the viability of this test. While the Court did not
explicitly address the adequacy-of-representation standard, it allowed
intervention without proof of collusion, adversity, or nonfeasance. 218
Two Justices dissented from the majority's abandonment of the
traditional test, 2 1 9 arguing that under the majority opinion even
"tactical disagreement over how litigation should be conducted" could
213. See id. at 539 ("[A] union member may have a valid complaint about the performance of
'his lawyer.' ").

214. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 (not
denying Secretary's claim that the government and proposed intervenor had identical interests).
215. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538-39 (arguing that despite having the same interest and
objective, the party's differing motivations may create divergent approaches to litigation).
216. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text (discussing the test of collusion,
adversity, or nonfeasance).
217. See Atl. Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (arguing that a
proposed intervenor should only need to show that representation may be inadequate and need
not prove lack of good faith or improper discharge of duties).
218. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 131-37 (1967).
219. Id. at 155-56 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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be sufficient to show inadequate representation. 220 In Trbovich, just
like in Cascade, there was no indication of collusion, bad faith, or
nonfeasance. 221 The Court allowed an absentee to intervene because it
had "a valid complaint about the performance of 'his lawyer' "2 2 2 -in
other words, a disagreement about litigation strategy is sufficient.
The Ninth Circuit's standard22 3 may be a fair interpretation of
Trbovich.224 In some past cases, this standard has been applied in
accordance with Trbovich to allow intervention when there is reason
to doubt that the party already in the case will make the same
arguments as the proposed intervenor. 225 However, as already
discussed, recent decisions effectively nullified the liberal
"undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor's argument" standard
by requiring a "compelling" evidentiary showing of the elements. 226
Most notably, the recent line of cases has consistently held that even if
a party already in the case has a different litigation strategy and
makes factual stipulations that the proposed intervenor believes are
incorrect, this is insufficient to prove that the current party will fail to
"make all of a proposed intervenor's arguments." 227 This result
conflicts indirectly with Cascade where, at least according to the
dissent, "tactical disagreement" was sufficient to show inadequate
220. Id. at 156 (suggesting that though "[miere tactical disagreement over how litigation
should be conducted is obviously insufficient," the majority might hold otherwise).
221. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 539 (1972) (permitting limited
intervention based on valid complaint about lawyer performance); Cascade, 386 U.S. at 155-56.

222. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539.
223. The standard analyzes "(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will
undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor's arguments; (2) whether the present party is
capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer
any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect." Perry v. Proposition
8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).
224. See Vreeland, supra note 13, at 293 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit's test is an
acceptable reading of Trbovich if it allows for intervention when the current party may not
prosecute the case as vigorously or has a different perspective than that of the proposed
intervenor).
225. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that representation may be inadequate since the proposed intervenor has special expertise and a
different perspective than the current parties). Notably in Sagebrush, the Secretary of the
Interior was the former president of the Mountain States Legal Foundation, the representative
of the plaintiff Sagebrush. Id. The proposed intervenor argued that based on this conflict of
interest the Secretary may use the United States Attorney to only provide a partial defense. Id.
However, the court specifically disclaimed any "collusion or of any other conduct detrimental to
the applicant's interest." Id. Thus, at least based on the text of the case, the result would be the
same whether or not this possible conflict existed.
226. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text (explaining that some courts require a
"compelling showing" of inadequate representation).
227. See, e.g., Perry, 587 F.3d at 952 (holding differences in litigation strategy are not
sufficient to justify intervention).
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representation 228 and with Trbovich where the Court's main proof of
inadequate representation was that the proposed intervenor did not
approve of the current party's representation. 229 Specifically in
Trbovich, the Court limited the intervenor's arguments to those
"claims of illegality presented by the [the current party's]
complaint." 230 Essentially, the only intervention allowed in Trbovich
was for differences in factual disputes and litigation strategies-the
intervenor was not allowed to bring any new arguments. 231
The most effective standard for judging adequacy of
representation is requiring a proposed intervenor to offer an adequate
explanation for the lack of sufficient representation or to show "some
conflict." 232 While this standard may be fairly critiqued for not giving
lower courts much guidance on what claims should prove inadequate
representation, this may in fact be its greatest strength. The Court
has never presented scenarios of situations that do or do not meet the
requirement, instead only asking that the proposed intervenor
demonstrate that representation "may be" inadequate. 233 This broad
requirement does not lend itself to a complex multipart test and
should be fulfilled when a court finds some divergence or conflict
between the parties.
IV. SOLUTION

In sum, the circuits have not followed the liberal intervention
standard suggested by the 1966 amendments and required by the
Supreme Court. While this application has reduced the amount of
valuable public-law intervention, the requirements created by the
courts of appeals are not inherently flawed. Rather, they reflect two
different approaches to two different intervention situations. In order
to solve these circuit splits while promoting intervention, three actions
228. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 156 (1967)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
229. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 539 (1972) (arguing intervention
should be allowed if the party has a complaint about his representation).
230. Id. at 537.
231. See id. at 537, 539 (limiting intervention to already existent arguments, but permitting
intervention for different litigation strategy).
232. See, e.g., B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 546 (1st Cir.
2006) ("[T]he intervenor need only offer 'an adequate explanation as to why' it is not sufficiently
represented by the named party."); Shea v. Angulo, 19 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[The
proposed intervenor 'must demonstrate, at the very least, that some conflict exists.' ").
233. See Jenkins, supra note 45, at 271 (arguing that other standards are inappropriately
high since the Supreme Court only requires that representation "may be inadequate," a
requirement fulfilled when the supposed representative's interests diverge from, or conflict with,
those of the movant).
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need to be taken-two minor changes and one significant alteration.
First, the standard of review for intervention of right should be de
novo review. Second, courts should increase the use of limited
intervention. Third, a separate standard should exist for private- and
public-law intervention.
A. Minor Changes to Intervention Procedures
First, the standard of review for intervention of right should be
de novo. Although other scholarship has disagreed with this
position, 234 only a de novo standard allows the appellate courts the
necessary authority to review and police the intervention standards.
Without this standard of review, it will not be possible to eliminate the
divergent results--often from courts claiming to apply the same
standards-in intervention practice.
The necessity of the de novo standard is illustrated by the very
design of Rule 24. Permissive intervention, as opposed to intervention
of right, requires a low standard to meet the eligibility requirements
but is designed to allow the district court discretion in whether to
ultimately grant or deny intervention. 235 In contrast, intervention of
right requires a higher standard, but it guarantees intervention if the
requirements are met. The design of Rule 24 represents a judgment
that any absentee that meets these requirements must be allowed to
intervene whether the district court judge agrees or not. No discretion
is intended. Furthermore, having a de novo standard of review also
encourages the appellate courts to adopt clear, easy-to-apply
standards. This helps prevent the current situation where the courts
of appeals often set "standards" but do not intend them to be
consistently applied. 236
Second, courts should expand the use of limited intervention,
and Rule 24 should be amended to expressly provide for limited
intervention. 237 Limited-intervention practice allows a party to
intervene, but limits its participation to the specific issue that
implicates its unrepresented interest. While this process is not
expressly provided for in Rule 24, it was recommended by the

234. See Appel, supra note 9, at 304 ("[T]he courts of appeals should review all decisions for
abuse of discretion.").
235. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (stating that "the court may permit anyone to intervene who"
meets certain criteria).
236. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting courts
often apply a more lenient analysis to public interest intervention).
237. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 51, at 375.
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Advisory Committee. 238 Although not explicitly expounded, this
approach was indirectly approved of in Trbovich when the Supreme
Court allowed intervention but confined the intervenor to promoting
the arguments already made by current parties. 239
Limited intervention is most appropriate in two circumstances:
when a party has a limited interest related to, but distinct from, the
suit as a whole and when the proposed intervenor is adequately
represented by additional parties except for in specific arguments.
This approach moderates the seemingly conflicting goals of allowing
wide representation of any asserted interests while also preventing
overly duplicative or complex litigation, thereby optimizing the
efficiency created by the intervention process. It preserves the
efficiency boost of resolving multiple issues at one time and in one suit
without the cost of dramatically increasing the complexity of the
litigation. For instance, if a party is adequately represented in a suit
except for one specific factual contest, the absentee could be allowed to
intervene solely to dispute that one fact.
B. Implementing the Dual Standardsfor Public Law and Private Law
While the aforementioned minor changes will help to fix the
current intervention practice, ultimately, courts should create two
separate standards for public-law and private-law cases. The liberal
standard created by the Supreme Court works well for public-law
intervention where the concerns of the private parties are less
troubling, complex litigation is more efficient, and wide intervention is
necessary to protect democratic interests. In contrast, the courts of
appeals' more narrow approaches are a better fit in private-law
litigation where there is a nonfrivolous concern that widespread
intervention could allow parties to needlessly complicate private
disputes. Ultimately, the best solution is to create a world where these
two regimes can coexist.
The new system of dual standards could be accomplished most
directly by amending Rule 24, but could also be accomplished through
an interpretive ruling by the Supreme Court. Since the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are already supposed to be interpreted to meet
practical goals, this interpretation would not impermissibly diverge

238. FED. R. CIv. P. 24 advisory committee note on the 1966 amendment ("An intervention of
right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive
among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings.").
239. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 537 (1972) (limiting intervention
to arguments already brought by the current party).
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from the text.240 Furthermore, recent Supreme Court cases
demonstrate a willingness to go far beyond the plain text of a rule
when necessary to achieve practical benefits. 24 1
The threshold difficulty under this mode of analysis is
distinguishing public- and private-law cases. While the nature of
public-law litigation is both common and fairly identifiable, borderline
cases exist that could be construed as either private or public.
Although it is fairly easy to identify common characteristics of publiclaw litigation, the term itself "defies crisp definition" that would be
necessary in using any bright-line test.24 2 Based on these definitional
hurdles, the best approach would be to acknowledge and embrace a
sliding scale where the more public a case is, the more liberal the
standard for intervention. Although this approach is disappointing in
that it does not provide an absolute answer in every case, it does make
intuitive sense. The more a case involves a public interest, the more it
should be considered under a standard adjusted for public-law
litigation. In applying this sliding scale, courts can best achieve the
efficiency that results from having separate standards.
Moreover, the specific requirements for intervention need to be
changed. First, in analyzing the sufficient-interest requirement, courts
should focus on whether the intervenor's interest is closely related to
the litigation instead of whether it is separately a legally sufficient
claim. Under this standard, the appropriate question is whether the
claimed interest has significant relevance to the litigation. Under this
standard, the division between public- and private-law litigation
partially occurs automatically-public-law litigation will inherently
implicate a far larger number of interests than the average privatelaw suit. However, even with this automatic protection, courts should
still require intervenors to have closer relationships in private-law
suits than in public-law suits. In a private-law suit, it is important to
prevent intervention when the intervenor's claims are only
tangentially related to the "property or transaction of the suit."2 4 3 This
both promotes efficiency by reducing complexity and protects the
individual interest of the private plaintiff. However, in the public-law
sphere, it is far more appropriate to allow intervention on a less
related interest; in public-law suits, the plaintiff has already to some
240. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating the rules "should be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action").
241. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (applying a higher
standard to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 in order to prevent frivolous litigation).
242. Appel, supra note 9, at 221.
243. See JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 2, at 626 (discussing the importance of
plaintiff primacy in intervention practice).
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degree created a matter of public dispute. This approach notably
mirrors the unwritten behavior of some courts. 244
Second, the adequacy-of-representation requirement should be
significantly reworked. The courts of appeals' presumption analysis is
unnecessary and overly complex. This is not to say the relationship to
extant parties or government representation is irrelevant, but it does
not warrant a higher standard. If a party can prove inadequacy of
representation, it makes little difference whether this inadequacy
occurs with a party who otherwise agrees with the proposed
intervenor or the government. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit's
tripartite test provides a convenient guide for adequacy in both the
public- and private-law arenas. The only difference should focus on the
term "argument." In a private-law suit, it makes sense that this
requirement should be interpreted as a moderate barrier. A private
party generally will have little interest in exactly how another private
party chooses to litigate a case. However, in the public-law arena,
there is sufficient reason to allow intervention, even on such small
issues as changes in litigation tactics or factual concessions. In this
environment, an absentee may have a significant interest in ensuring
another party provides the most aggressive defense or complaint
possible. Furthermore, in unsettled areas of law, especially those that
are widely and publicly disputed, factual issues and litigation strategy
may make a far greater difference in the outcome. In these
circumstances, it is appropriate to use conditional intervention.
V. CONCLUSION
The emergence of public-law litigation has put new pressures
on the traditional system of litigation. Thankfully, the system has
matured under this load by reinventing and expanding different
mechanisms to compensate victims. Intervention is one of these
mechanisms. Because public-law litigation controls so many
instrumental areas of law, it is essential that the mechanism works
well. This Note discussed how intervention has the potential to meet
the needs of public-law cases and how recent innovations dramatically
increased the effectiveness of intervention in the public-law sphere.
However, this Note also showed how current precedents created by the
courts of appeals have created a fractured system that is not
sufficiently protective of public-law interests. These approaches, most
244. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (explaining that public law litigation
calls for adequate representation in the proceedings of the range of interests that will be
affected).
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of which have their own benefits, illustrate the problem created by
trying to make one mechanism fit the needs of both private- and
public-law litigation. Finally, this Note proposed a solution that both
preserves protection for private plaintiffs and expands intervention to
increase representation in public-law cases.
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